Adoption of Blockchain Technologies in Agriculture: A Multilevel Analysis

Abstract

To fill the theoretical gap in the literature regarding the adoption of blockchain technologies in the agriculture sector, this research attempts to analyze the global supply chain management of the agriculture sector through the lens of globalization. The empirical analysis deciphers increased adoption of blockchain technologies in the agriculture sector by applying the Coase theorem that suggests the existence of low transaction costs and bargaining power leads to positive externalities for the involved and uninvolved parties. Against this background, the research hypothesis is that the implementation of blockchain technologies in the agriculture sector decreases transaction costs between parties leading to increased interconnectedness. The paper operationalizes the analysis by using a multilevel framework that emphasizes the emergence of new ideas, norms, concepts, practices or doctrines.

Introduction

Since the original creation of blockchain technology (BCT) by Nakamoto (2008), the peer-topeer distributed data infrastructure could be named as one of the most influential technologies thanks to the increased adoption of cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin (Statista, 2021). As the BCT is being appropriated in various fields, the effects of the technology on academic research can be seen in different disciplines such as the economy (Zvyagin 2019), trade (Bamakan et al. 2022), education (Zhou et al. 2020), medicine (Stawicki et al. 2018) and international relations (Campbell-Verduyn et al. 2021). In this connection, one can name smart agriculture utilizing the same decentralized, distributed data infrastructure which allows a democratic way of managing information. As Wang et. al. pointed out, the implementation of blockchain technologies in the agriculture sector has profound implications for how global supply chains operate (2018) such as supply chain visibility and real-time tracking (Li et al. 2017), information symmetry and capacity risk mitigation (Nakasumi 2017), product traceability (Tian 2016), and smart contracts for monitoring (Weber et al. 2016). In light of this, it can be said that understanding the implementation effects of BCT in the agriculture sector in terms of how ‘supraterritorial’ relations are being established can inform us how collective action problems (CAPs) could be addressed by the increased connectedness that blockchain technologies offer. In his book, The Logic of Collective Action, economist, and political scientist Mancur Olson built his theory around how certain groups consolidate benefits compared to spreading costs to the public (1971). Accordingly, CAPs generate a free-rider problem that is in its essence an inefficient allocation of resources due to the interests of a small minority becoming over-represented while the interests of the majority are diffused. From this perspective, the research looks at the supply chain management of the agriculture sector from a collective action problem perspective as the global turnover of agricultural products increases each year (PSD Online 2022). For example, despite small-scale farmers producing 80 percent of the global coffee production (Fairtrade.org 2018), the majority of the producers are not able to earn a reliable living through its cultivation (Wang et al. 2018).

In this context, it is important to understand how the recent increased adoption of BCT in the agriculture sector affects the transaction costs between national and international parties. In other words, as the global turnover of agricultural products follows an upwards trend in the global markets, the costs and benefits to each involved party change dramatically based on their representation power in decision-making processes. The perspective informs how CAPs occur as the interests of small-scale farmers that represent the majority are diffused while the overall output of the agricultural products continues to increase. In this sense, blockchain technologies are considered to be a democratic way of managing transactions amongst involved parties thanks to the traceability of each transaction within the system. As blockchain technologies continue to impact how digital contracts are configured, the effects can be seen in different fields such as the role of NFTs in the digital economy (e.g. Wilson et al. 2021). Moreover, blockchain technologies continue to infiltrate the organization of market exchange, and the implications of blockchain technologies in terms of their effects on society are not well understood. Market exchange amongst involved and uninvolved party refers to the transaction costs that each party must bear to remain part of the global supply chains. In the current state of market organization, the interest of small-scale producers that are not represented as a collective could be underrepresented as the transaction costs for these parties can exceed their output in their local market. The new ideals of blockchain technology claim to have profound effects on how the market exchange transactions can be executed without the need for power transfer to centralized and consolidated actors. Accordingly, the agricultural output of a country has an impact on the configuration of global supply chains. Therefore, the wider use of BCT in the agricultural sector has potential tools to change the configuration of market exchange, and this phenomenon is not well understood in the international relations academic field. This research aims to provide a new theoretical approach to empirically analyze the BCT effects on transaction costs and information asymmetry amongst involved parties. By introducing this new theoretical approach, the current form of global supply chains in the agricultural sector is conceptualized based on CAPs. Moreover, the introduction of BCT to the agricultural sector is deciphered through the analysis of transaction costs amongst involved parties. Considering the forecasted three-fold increase in the value of blockchain in agriculture (Statista, 2018), the research aims to answer what are the transactional effects of blockchain technology implementation in the agriculture sector between actors across South America and Africa.

Literature Review

Robert Coase, who was an economist, conceptualized the problem of social cost which is also referred to as the Coase theorem in the literature (e.g Ellingsen and Paltseva 2016). According to the Coase theorem, the presence of low transaction costs, which facilitates bargaining and consensus power between parties, makes sides better off without making them worse, therefore, leading to a Pareto improvement. The theorem was primarily applied in the case of externalities which could be negative or positive as they can inquire cost or benefit to an uninvolved party of a transaction. In this sense, negative externalities can also be considered as the consequence of CAPs due to unequal relationships that are produced by the interaction of the parties that far-reach to uninvolved parties as well. Coase theorem has been applied in various disciplines such as law (e.g. Parisi 2003), economics (e.g. Acemoglu 2003), and international relations (e. g. Cooper 1995). As Coase highlighted, “[…] we have to bear in mind that a change in the existing system which will lead to an improvement in some decisions may well lead to a worsening of others. Furthermore, we have to take into account the costs involved in operating the various social arrangements” (1960, 44). In this respect, the increased adoption of BCT in the agriculture sector brings a new change in the existing system that produces negative externalities for small-scale producers, therefore the Coase theorem allows the conceptualization of transaction costs amongst parties in the global supply chain of the agricultural products. From this perspective, the Coase theorem can be considered when analyzing the effects of adopting BCT in global agriculture supply chain management on transaction costs.

The changes that the introduction of BCT technologies brings to the agricultural sector can be understood in terms of supply chain visibility and real-time tracking. In this context, Li et al. emphasize the significance of affordability and reliability of supply chain visibility considering the increased complexity of supply chain networks and the effects on production costs of goods and their availability in the market (2017). Based on this, supply chain visibility and real-time tracking that BCT offers can be understood as the ability of a given company to increase its competitiveness as it enables involved parties to increase their level of participation within Supply Chain Operating Networks which allows market exchange amongst parties. Another important concept that explains BCTs’ effects on global supply chains can be mentioned as information symmetry and capacity risk mitigation. In their research, Nakasumi points out that existing Supply Chain Operating Networks are not based on real-time data which is informed by the live movement of goods amongst parties and this creates asymmetric information between companies that leads to the disturbance of planning (2017). Information symmetry and capacity risk mitigation refer to the distributed data system that “[…] allows users to transfer currency (bitcoins) securely without a centralized regulator, using a publicly verifiable open ledger (or blockchain). Since then, Bitcoin demonstrated how these blockchains can serve other functions requiring trusted computing and auditability” (Nakasumi 2017, 143). Accordingly, the introduction of BCT in the management of agriculture sector supply chains can enable an information symmetry between actors that represents the interests of the majority through the decentralized structure that it establishes. Another significant concept that contributes to the reduction of transaction costs amongst involved parties can be named as smart contracts for monitoring. Weber et al. pointed out, BCT as an emerging technology enables decentralized and transactional data sharing in a network of untrusted participants in the market exchange (2016). Consequently, “[blockchain technologies] can be used to find agreement about the shared state of collaborating parties without trusting a central authority or any particular participant” (Weber et al. 2016, 329). Therefore, smart contracts for monitoring refers to the appropriation of blockchain technologies to address trust problem in the collaborative processes (Weber et al. 2016). The concept of smart contracts has direct implications on the effects of BCT technologies in the organization of the agricultural sector as it allows the reduction of transaction costs through the increased trust amongst involved parties.

While the dynamic relations between involved and uninvolved parties in supply chain management of agriculture can be established on the ground of the Coase theorem, the increased adoption of BCT can be conceptualized through the concept of globalization. Scholte defined globalization as the spread of connections between people by involving reductions in barriers to transworld social contacts (Scholte 2008). Based on this, BCT can be situated as part of a larger dynamic of social change that encompasses ‘supraterritorial’ relations. As Scholte highlighted “territorial locations, territorial distances and territorial borders do not define the whole geography of today’s transplanetary flows’ (2008, 13). Therefore, since its first introduction in 2008, BCT can be considered as a decentralized extension to global supply chain relations that allows interaction ‘beyond territorial space’.

On the basis of the literature review findings of As Wang et al. who analyzed a total of 24 articles that used BCT in the context of supply chain management, it can be emphasized that “[…] majority of papers were either conceptual or technical in nature” (2018, 75) as they lack an explicit theoretical lens. Looking at more recently conducted research shows a similar pattern as the adoption of BCT in global supply chain management is still in infancy (e.g. Fosso Wamba et al. 2020). A bibliometric review on BCT and supply chain topics related to 628 publications that encompass only peer-reviewed articles and conference papers found that the number of academic papers has increased between 2017 and 2020 and smart contract, traceability, and logistics were among the most frequently occurring keywords (Rejeb et al. 2021).

By aiming to fill the theoretical gap in the literature, this research aims to describe the increased adoption of BCT in global supply chain management through the lens of globalization that allows increased interconnectedness. Next, the research aims to empirically analyze how increased adoption of BCT in the agriculture sector affects the transaction costs between national and international parties by applying the Coase theorem which suggests the existence of low transaction costs and bargaining power leads to positive externalities for the involved and uninvolved parties. Against this background, the research hypothesis is that the implementation of blockchain technologies in the agriculture sector decreases transaction costs between parties leading to increased interconnectedness.

Research Design and Methodology

Joachim Koops outlines four levels of analysis for inter-organizational relations that focuses on levels and units that are beyond the international system, the state, and the individual (2017). The methodology aims to put forward an analytic tool that “[…] not only explore major changes in terms of power constellations, international structures or crises, but also explore the emergence of new ideas, norms, concepts, practices or doctrines” (Koops 2017, 195). Considering BCT as a major shift in how global supply chain management is being configured, the research will utilize a multilevel framework of analysis that is consists of the member state/national level, the role of the individual, the role of the bureaucracy, the InterInstitutional level and inter-secretariat level (Koops 2017). According to Koops, the state/national level refers to the key decision-making powers that encompass not only the significance of state power but also the perceived and actual influence of the state in the function and impact of inter-organizational relations (2017). Based on this, the state/national level is understood as the state’s capacity to foster negotiation power, contractual relationships between organizations, creation, funding of inter-organizational liaison, and cooperation across organizations (Koops 2017). Koops highlights the role of the individual from a multilevel analysis perspective as the initiator and facilitator of trust among international organizations (2017). According to Koops “it is often at the individual level that relations between organizations are initiated, fostered and executed” (2017, 201). For this reason, the role of the individual carries significance as the interconnected mechanisms through internet technologies allowed individuals to have increasing responsibility in the spread of cyber messages as well as the contribution to fostering official and unofficial interactions of which inter-national relations consist (Koops 2017). The third level that Koops outlines in the multilevel analysis is the role of the bureaucracy. Koops mentions that “it is at the secretariat level that initial partnership agreements are prepared, formulated and implemented (2017, 204). Suitably, the role of the bureaucracy encompasses permanent committees and formal cooperation channels that operate on inter-institutional grounds. Therefore the framework of multilevel analysis looks for the ways in which the role of the bureaucracy facilitates “[…] multilateral divisions, partnership units or specific committees dedicated to cross-thematic cooperation with other organizations” (Koops 2017, 204). Finally, at the Inter-Institutional level and inter-secretariat level, Koops mentions that the analysis encompasses “the emergence, workings, and outcomes of jointly created inter-institutional committees, cooperation fora or regular, institutionalized arrangements between two or more organizations” (2017, 206).

On the grounds of the multilevel framework of analysis that is briefly explained, the research aims to look at South American and African countries to discover the effects of BCT in the agricultural sector on the transaction costs among different actors. As the analysis framework focuses on how cooperation is enabled at various levels, the research aims to understand the effects of smart agriculture in the reduction of social costs by means of the bargaining power of the actors. In this vein, firstly, the analysis shows cases of blockchain use in the agriculture sector in various regions of South America and Africa. Next, the empirical analysis follows on the grounds of the Coase theorem that predicts increased interconnectedness would imply Pareto efficient outcomes among involved and uninvolved parties in the market exchange.

Analysis and Results

Looking at smart agriculture applications at the member state/national level, the power of the state as the key decision-maker stands out. For example, the state governments of Bahia and Rio Grande do Norte in Brazil show how the agenda of the state can provide a key resource to implement joint inter-organizational projects between World Bank rural development and mentioned state governments. “The Online Procurement Solution app, known as SOL in Portuguese, helps farmers access suppliers throughout the country and stores all the processes and data required for transactions” (World Bank 2019). As the Coase theorem suggests, a reduction in transaction costs leads to a Pareto improvement for the involved parties. In this context, it can be said that the introduction of BCT in the supply chain management of the agriculture sector leads to positive externalities at the member state/national level as the cooperation allows to deepen existing inter-organizational liaison with governmental bodies.

According to Information and Communication Technology (ICTs) in Agriculture report written by Truby et al. smart agriculture applications in sub-Saharan Africa have a profound impact on how these technologies enable access to appropriate agricultural information on the role of individuals and the role of bureaucracy levels (2022). According to the report “digitalization is strengthening the participation, interactions, and market linkage among smallholder producers leading to improved productivity and profitability” (Truby et al. 2022, 4). In this context, empirical studies show that the introduction of BCT to the agriculture sector has the potential to reduce the time and costs of traveling by farmers as well as facilitating social learning and generating employment opportunities in African countries such as Tanzania (e.g. Consolata 2017; Quandt et al. 2020). In another instance, Aker and Mbiti suggest in their research that “[…] in Niger mobile phones reduce search costs by 50 percent as compared with personal travel. Mobile phones can also allow people to obtain information immediately and on a regular basis […]” (2010, 215). As the empirical research results suggest, the introduction of smart agriculture tools allows for increased interconnectedness on the role of the individual level by reducing the transaction costs among individuals significantly. In this sense, the idea of interconnectedness can be understood based on how increasing levels of global connections facilitates the extension of the planet anywhere at the same time (transworld simultaneity) and the ability to move anywhere on the planet in no time (transworld instantaneity) (Scholte 2008). From this perspective, it can be said that the role of bureaucracy outlines the formal interactions between individuals and inter-institutional actors that enables increased globalization in terms of the interdependence between different actors. In this respect, BCT can be considered as the main tool that contributes to reducing the transaction costs among states.

The study that is conducted by Inter-American Development Bank suggests how the cooperation on the Inter-Institutional level and inter-secretariat level can lead to an increase in productivity, sustainability, and resilience to climate change in the agricultural sector in the South America region (Roberto et al. 2019). The study suggests that “there is a strong digital component that is already being developed in the region which is also expected to incorporate solutions such as Blockchain technology.” (Roberto et al. 2019, 20). Including traceability along the logistics chain of food and agricultural products, Roberto et al. emphasize that implementation of BCT in agricultural sector has strong effects on the support of agricultural innovation as the technology make the production and supply chain management more efficient (Roberto et al. 2019). While only 1% of the enterprises in South America found to be utilizing the blockchain technologies, the impact on the supply chain management on the bigger scale is visible in terms of its effects on small producers. In this regard, cooperation in the InterInstitutional level and inter-secretariat level reflects that the interconnectedness among various actors increases through the implementation of smart agriculture technologies. As the Coase theorem suggests, when the transaction costs are decreased and bargaining power of the parties enabled by the multilevel organizational structure, the outcomes reflect the benefit of the majority. For instance, considering that “in the SSA region, smallholder farming remains the predominant form of agriculture representing nearly 80% of its total farmers” (Mapiye et al. 2021), strong representation and increased interconnectedness are vital for these spread farmer communities to prevent getting diffused costs and less benefits compared to the small minority that shapes legislation such as through lobbying. In this vein, the empirical examples show that conceptualization of BCT technologies regarding collective action problems that society faces can be beneficial to deciphering its effects on globalization. Thereby, Scholte pointed out “people become more able — physically, legally, linguistically, culturally, and psychologically — to engage with each other wherever on earth they might be” (2008, 11). Accordingly, smart agriculture can be understood as one of the contributors to increased globalization. Moreover, the wider use of BCT technologies in the agricultural sector has the potential of solving the problem of social cost as it allows stronger bargaining power in different levels of actors as well as reduces the transaction costs for the parties. As Coase said, “the cost of exercising a right […] is always the loss which is suffered elsewhere in consequence of the exercise of that right” (1960, 44). Therefore, increased adoption of BCT in agriculture can help to reduce this transactional loss that occurs due to information asymmetries.

Conclusion and Reflection

This paper aimed at understanding the recent increased adoption of blockchain technologies in the agricultural sector through the lenses of the Coase theorem and globalization. The empirical analysis that utilized a multilevel framework of the analysis showed that the implementation of blockchain technologies in the agriculture sector decreases transaction costs between parties as the technologies offer higher productivity and cheaper production costs for the farmers. In this light, the paper conceptualized the reduction of social cost in terms of increased interconnectedness that constitute globalization by facilitating transworld simultaneity and transworld instantaneity. From this perspective, the research looked at the BCT through a unique theoretical lens that attempted to define the reason for the increased adoption of BCT in the global supply management of the agricultural sector in terms of globalization. Moreover, the consequences of this technology are understood through the bargaining power that each level of actor gains. Accordingly, it was shown that this consensus power has profound effects on the reduction of transaction costs in society as the representation of the majority gets stronger.

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